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1 · Dossier · 1920-1933
Fait partie de Institute for Contemporary History

I. Pact of Four Powers, disarmament, colonial question, cooperation Germany-Italy, April-May 1933 [676 002-676 205], therein:1. telegram ambassador Paris, 08. April 1933: government declaration Daladier concerning Revision questions, Bégery for controlled disarmament with subsequent arms equality, doubts of the French voters about security solely through alliance with the small Entente and Poland, concern about possible isolation;2. Note and Correspondence Foreign Office, Embassy London, 07-10. April 1933: Discussion of Ambassador Hoesch with John Simon and Vansittart on the Four-Power Pact, no fundamental reservations of England against revision ideas despite rejection by Vansittart, British (British) efforts for compromise formula because of presumed resistance France, German (German) negotiations with France only after knowledge of the French memo and Italy's further course of action;3. telegram Embassy Moscow, 08 April 1933: Announcement Litvinow on early conclusion of the Four-Pact and benevolent statement USA;4. Note from the Federal Foreign Office (Bülow) on the report of Italian (Italian) ambassadors, 10 April 1933: Inquiries by Norman Davis concerning the failure of the USA to invite him to participate in the Four-Power Pact, statements by Mussolini about possible American accession after the unification of the European powers;5. Records from Bülow, Correspondence from the Reich Foreign Ministry, Embassy in Rome, 12 April 1933.April 18, 1933: Statement by Mussolini on the French Four-Power Pact draft and suggestion to postpone the disarmament conference until after the conclusion of the Pact; discussion by Mussolini, Papen, Hassell, German concerns and proposals for change, instructions to the embassies of Rome and London, with French version of the draft Four-Power Pact. with cover letter from the German Embassy in Brussels, 14 April 1933;8. Notes by Bülow on a meeting with the French and Italian ambassadors, 19 April 1933: Statement by France and German statement on Mussolini proposals concerning the Four-Power Pact; ignorance of Hitler concerning the French proposal for the German-French assistance pact and its rejection by Blomberg; Italian concern about possible military understanding between Germany and France and the German-Russian (German-Russian) ambassador to Germany; 8. notes by Bülow on the meeting with the French and Italian ambassadors, 19 April 1933: Statement by France and German statement on Mussolini proposals concerning the Four-Power Pact; ignorance of Hitler concerning the French proposal for the German-French assistance pact and its rejection by Blomberg; Italian concern about possible military understanding between Germany and France and the German-Russian (German-Russian) ambassadors of the German-Russian ambassadors; 8.Russian) Relations;9. telegrams Embassy in Rome, Foreign Office, 19 April 1933: Italian insistence on Hitler's decision concerning further negotiations between Italy and France and England on the Four Pact at a meeting with Papen, Hassell, Suvich, Aloisi; recommendation for an accelerated conclusion due to the isolation of Germany; German colonial wishes; points from the German minimum demand;10. telegrams to the Embassy in Rome, Federal Foreign Office, 19 April 1933: Italian pressure for a decision by Hitler on the Four Pact; recommendation for an accelerated conclusion due to the isolation of Germany; German colonial wishes; points from the German minimum demand;10. Federal Foreign Office, Telegram Bülow, 20-21 April 1933: Discussion Papen, Bülow, Gaus on negotiations in Rome; formulations and draft pacts; intention of Hitler to consult Papen and Blomberg; approval of the drafts with minor changes;11. Correspondence, Embassy London, Foreign Office, 20-25 April 1933: Instructions to the English Embassy Berlin for discussion with the Foreign Ministry on Art. 19 of the League of Nations Statute in relation to the Four-Party Pact; clarification of German wishes regarding the handling of revision issues by four powers, also outside the League of Nations; 12th Circular, Foreign Office, to embassies and missions, 20 April 1933: Development of negotiations on the Four-Power Pact; assessment of draft texts, with development and memos, partly in French, German, English, French and Italian, English, and German counterproposals;13. telegram Embassy Rome, April 20, 1933: Statements by Mussolini on the German-Italian. Cooperation in the Danube Region, Colonial Question, League of Nations Policy, Relations with Austria; Advice from Mussolini to Dollfuss and Billigg, no official approval of the position by Hitler yet;14. Federal Foreign Office (Bülow) to Embassy London, 28. April 1933: Information and instructions on the new version of the Four-Power Pact; state of negotiations; Hitler's approval of the German position; instructions to the German Embassy in Paris, with annexes; 15th telegram from the Embassy in Rome, Foreign Office, 21-22 April 1933: Preparation of a "gentlemen's agreement" with the Italian Embassy in Paris, with annexes; 15th telegram from the Embassy in Rome, Foreign Office, 21-22 April 1933: Preparation of a "gentlemen's agreement" with the Italian Embassy in Paris, with annexes to the "Agreement". Government concerning colonies; Aliosi statement on German requests for change, in particular dates of rearmament;16. Records Foreign Office, telegram Embassy Paris, 24-27 April 1933: German proposals handed over to Daladier; no French presumption yet concerning German intention to create an institution of signatories outside the League of Nations, discussion with Francois-Poncet on draft pacts, interest Foreign Office for German rearmamentFrench Assistance Pact;17. telegrams German delegation Geneva, Foreign Office, 27 April 1933: False report Reichswehr Ministry on final rejection of German equality in arms matters by France and England; concerns Francois-Poncet against German disarmament proposals;18. Telegramme Embassy London, 27 April 1933 and 01 May 1933: Statement by John Simon on German amendments to the Four Pact and the French position; concerns about German armament after 5 years; discussion with Ambassador Grandi, Hoesch on the inclusion of the French draft in Rome and Italian. Negotiations with France and Germany;19. telegram Embassy Rome, Foreign Office, 02.-05. May 1933: Communication Suvich concerning negotiations with British and French ambassadors on the Four Pact; most important changes compared to French text; compromise proposal Reich Foreign Ministry on arms claim and general observations Neurath on the Pact;20. telegram Embassy Paris, 05. May 1933: Communication Suvich concerning negotiations with British and French ambassadors on the Four Pact; most important changes compared to French text; compromise proposal Reich Foreign Ministry on arms claim and general observations Neurath on the Pact;20. telegram Embassy Paris, 05. May 1933: Communication Suvich on the Pact. May 1933: Quotes from Senate Speech by Foreign Minister Paul-Boncourt; concern about the Austrian loan because of uncertainty about the political situation; prevention of a block formation in Europe through cooperation with Italy and the Four Pact within the framework of the League of Nations; statement on secret armament in Germany; II. Foreign Office: Mussolini Pact, May-September 1933; original version of the Four-Power Pact Mussolini, London and Paris versions; memo of the French government, German proposals; reports, in part English, french [Original file vol. 2] [676 206-676 644]; therein:1. German Embassy Ankara, 06. May 1933: no striving of Italy for alliance with Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria; cooling of the Turkish-Italian relations because of four power pact and debt question;2. Note from the Federal Foreign Office (Bülow), Telegrams from the embassies in Rome and London, 10-13 May 1933: Mussolini's negotiations with France and England on the basis of German proposals on the Four Pact; Mussolini's remarks on revision, corridor question, German version of the text.russian Treaty; Suvich's doubts about armament; Vansittart's appreciation of German concessions; negotiations discontinued on Italian agreement. Wunsch, mit Pakten dra drafts;3. telegram message London, 16. May 1933: consternation about Papen speech; tense expectation of the rally Hitler; no official British statement about sanctions, aversion of England against involvement in possibly continental war;4. note and note Reichsaußenministerium, Auswärtiges Amt an Blomberg u.a., 16.-20. May 1933: statement to ital. Compromise proposals for four pacts, especially arms issues; Göring inquires from Rome about pact negotiations; Neurath approves limitation of pact to five years; 5. notes by Reich Foreign Minister and Bülow, telegram from Embassy in Rome, 21-22. May 1933: Fundamental agreement Göring-Mussolini on new version of the Four-Party Pact, discussion of contentious points by Hassell and Suvich, reservations of the Federal Foreign Office against new draft, discussion Neurath, Göring on Roman negotiations, including Austrian question;6. Aufzeichnungen Auswärtiges Amt (Neurath, Bülow), May 24, 1933: Discussion with Hitler, Papen, and others, on the Four-Power Pact, Hitler advocates approval after the Abandonment Conference, Bülow's statement on British allegations concerning Mussolini's relationship to the Pact and enquiry about the German Pact for the Promotion of the Rights of the Child, and the German Pact for the Promotion of the Rights of the Child.Austrian tensions;7. telegram message Paris to Federal Foreign Office, press department, 24. May 1933: press reports about planned England journey Göring, Viermächtepakt and German emigrants;8. records Federal Foreign Office, telegrams legation Athens, message Rome among other things, 25.-28. May 1933: Resistance of the small Entente and Poland against Viermächtepakt, attitude France, England, Greece to the pact conclusion, German - Italian. Disagreement over time of initialling, with ital. Draft;9th WTB report, telegrams from the Federal Foreign Office to embassies in Rome, London, Paris, 28-29 May 1933: 'Matin' report on planned French guarantee concerning maintenance of contracts with allies and French politics after conclusion of the Four Power Pact, statement by the Reich Foreign Ministry;10th records from the Federal Foreign Office (Neurath, Bülow) about meetings with Hitler, Blomberg and others, 29 May-01 June 1933: Hitler's approval of the Quad Pact subject to Mussolini's declaration concerning the tragweite of part of the Equality Clause; approval of initialling of the Pact;11 May-01 June 1933: WTB Message, telegrams German delegation Geneva, embassies Paris, Rome, 29-31 May 1933: Hitler's approval of the Quad Pact subject to Mussolini's declaration concerning the tragweite of part of the Equality Clause; consent to initialling of the Pact;11 May-01 June 1933: Hitler's approval of the Quad Pact; 11 May 1933: Hitler's approval of the Pact; 11 May 1933: Hitler's approval of the Pact; 11 May 1933: Hitler's approval of the Pact; 11 May 1933: Hitler's approval of the Pact. May 1933: Initialling; statement of the French press, Mussolini doubts special French guarantee for allies, distribution of the alleged wording of the pact by British United Press;12. Bülow submissions, Federal Foreign Office records, telegrams to embassies in Rome, Paris, etc.., 31 May-07 June 1933: Tug-of-war over final editing of the Four Power Pact, Daladier declaration on agreement, fears of possible Polish attempts to form an Eastern bloc, Leger denial of a special French guarantee to allies, with drafts, reports on Times articles concerning Anschluss Austria;13. Secret submission from the Foreign Office (Bülow) about the content of the Mussolini message to Hitler, 01 June 1933: Endangerment of the Four Powers Pact by German resistance against Article 2 and German desire concerning disarmament talks at an earlier point in time, appeal to confidence in Hitler in support by Italy, speculation about French disarmament, German disarmament talks at an earlier point in time, German disarmament talks at an earlier point in time, German disarmament talks at an earlier point in time, German disarmament talks at an earlier point in time, German disarmament talks at an earlier point in time, German disarmament talks at an earlier point in time, German disarmament talks at an earlier point in time, German disarmament talks at an earlier point in time, German disarmament talks at an earlier point in time, German disarmament at an earlier point in time, German disarmament at an earlier point in time, German disarmament at an earlier point in time, French disarmament. Statements to allies, instructions Mussolini to Ambassador Cerruti concerning lecture at Hitler;14. Records Foreign Office (Köpke) about long-distance call with Göring, 03. June 1933: Information about announced conference Daladier, Davis, Londonderry in Paris, brit. Attempts to influence France for concessions to Germany in disarmament matter;15. handwritten note Reichsaußenministerium, 07 June 1933: Adoption of the Four Powers Pact by Hitler, order by Hitler to authorize Ambassador Hassell to sign, information of the Italian Foreign Ministry, and the German Foreign Ministry's decision to accept the Pact. Ambassador and Instructions Hassell;16. Awards Federal Foreign Office (Hassell), Telegram Embassy Rome, 08 June 1933: Announcement of the conclusion of the Four Pact by Mussolini with emphasis on the question of revision and German equality of armament, Reactions of the Italian Federal Foreign Office (Hassell), Telegram Embassy Rome, 08 June 1933: Announcement of the Four Pact Agreement by Mussolini with emphasis on the question of revision and German equality of armaments, Reactions of the Italian Federal Foreign Office (Hassell), 16. Senate, Romania's satisfaction with German recognition of the League of Nations, Locarno Pact;17. Records Federal Foreign Office (Bülow), Telegram Reich Foreign Ministry, Embassies of Rome, Paris, 09-15 June 1933: Exchange of Notes Paul-Boncourt, Ambassador Osusky on the interpretation of the Four-Party Pact in matters of revision and maintenance of the closest French- German law; 17.Czechoslovak cooperation, similar notes to Poland and others, statement by Mussolini, Neurath and others, no signing of the pact before clarification of the French position;18. Telegrams Embassies Rome, Paris, 09-11 June 1933: Meeting Mussolini, Hassell concerning the settlement of disarmament issues or freedom of rearmament for Germany after signing of the Four-Party Pact; Italian: "The European Union and the European Union"; "The European Union and the European Union"; "The European Union and the European Union"; "The European Union and the European Union"; "The European Union and the European Union"; "The European Union"; "The European Union and the European Union"; "The European Union"; "The European Union and the European Union"; "The European Union; "The European Union and the European Union"; "The European Union and the European Union"; "The European Union; "The European Union and the European Union". Press; Chamber Speech Daladier, Background;19. Telegram Embassy Washington, 12. and 15. June 1933: Reactions of the USA to the Four Power Pact, Philipp's Statement on the French Interpretation of the Pact, Formal American Objections to French Proceedings;20. Vorlagen Auswärtiges Amt (Bülow), Embassy Rome, 13.-26. June 1933: Recommendations and Negotiations Mussolini, Neurath et al. concerning Response to the French Pact, 12. and 15. June 1933: The USA's Reactions to the Four Power Pact, Philipp's Statement on the French Interpretation of the Pact, Formal American Objections to French Proceedings;20. Note to small Entente and Poland, Neurath order on further action, instructions to Ambassador Hassell on handing over protocol and oral statement to Mussolini, with text of note;21. Telegrams Foreign Ministry, Embassy Paris, 16 Juni-05. July 1933: Suvich about meeting Hitler-Mussolini and plans Mussolini, reports of the french press and statement french government about possible pronunciation Daladier-Mussolini, thought french government circles about personal contact Daladier-Hitler;22. records Reich Foreign Ministry about meeting with ital. Ambassador, 30 June 1933: Hope Mussolini for early signing of the Four Pact and meeting of heads of government to discuss arms issues, proposal Neurath to the German-Italian. Feelings concerning subjects of consultation;23. Telegrams Papen, Embassy Rome, 30 June and 04 July 1933: Assurance to Mussolini on behalf of Hitler about disinterest in annexation of Austria because of German-Italian border. Relations, statements by Mussolini about alleged reorganization of the Danube region, economic cooperation with Germany in Southeastern Europe and Italian-French understanding, insistence on conclusion of Concordat;24. Records from the Foreign Office, WTB report, telegrams from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, embassies in Rome, Paris, 11-17 July 1933: Approval of Italian agreement. Note verbale to England and France concerning protest against French guarantee for allies, signature of Four Power Pact, Paul-Boncourt meeting with Ambassador Jouvenel and interview on Pact, with congratulatory messages from heads of government;25. Records Foreign Office, Telegrams Embassy Rome, 11 July-08 September 1933: Statement ital. Government to treaty negotiations with USSR, Russian disgruntlement because of German action against Jews and Communists, statement by Foreign Minister Tewfik Ruschdy on Turkish Ostpolitik, benevolent assessment Russian-Italian. Agreement by Bülow;III. Foreign Office, Office of the Reich Minister: Federalism, September 1920-October 1923 [Original file volume 2] [676 645-676 810], therein:1. record Simon [excerpt], 20. September 1920: reference Greek legation to attempts emanating from Bavaria to found a monarchistic triple alliance Bavaria-Austria-Hungary, trust Simon in Kahr's adherence to Reich unity, surveillance of separatist efforts;2. Foreign Office memo on meeting with English chargé d'affaires, 23 September 1920: Expectation of a monarchist coup in Bavaria, Landesschießen 25 September 1920, attempts by Lincoln Trebitsch to reconcile with England;3. Foreign Office memo on conversation with Gesandtem Naumann, 29 January [September?] 1920: The situation in Poland worsens, Russian troops march up. Troops at the Lithuanian border, monarchist agitation in Bavaria with connections to Austria, Hungary, France, Belgium, unclear role of Erzbergers, Naumann report on Reichstreue Kahr;4. Correspondence Simon, German Embassy Bern (Müller), 17th and 29th century, German Embassy Bern (Müller), 17th and 29th century, German Embassy Bern (Müller), 17th and 29th century, German Embassy Bern (Müller), 17th century, 17th century, 17th century. September 1920: Application of the Hungarian imperial crown to Karl von Habsburg by former minister Benitzky on behalf of Horthy; conditions of Hungary and Habsburg, preparation of Karl von Habsburg's illegal journey through Austria, risk due to Wissen Renner, refusal of restoration by small Entente;5th Reich Chancellery Fehrenbach to Reich Foreign Minister Simons, 29. September 1920: Kahr's energetic position against the dissolution of the local defence forces at a meeting in Munich; wishes of the Bavarian government regarding diplomatic representation of the Reich; endorsement of the appointment of Zech as envoy in Munich by Reich Minister of the Interior Koch (with attached letter Koch to Fehrenbach of 28 September 1920). September);6th Report, [without author], 08 October 1920: Strength and Armament of the Resident Armed Forces in Munich and Bavaria; Relationship between the Resident Armed Forces and Jews; Cessation of the Resident Armed Forces to Prussia, Echerich, and Epp;7th Report German Embassy Rome, 11 October 1920, [without author]. October 1920: Alleged intention of the Bavarian government to send an envoy to Naples;8. Aufzeichnungen Auswärtiges Amt, 16. October 1920: Discussion with Bavarian envoy Preger concerning inhabitant questions and representatives of the Reich government in Munich;9. report, [without author], [1920]: Monarchistic and separatist efforts of the organization Escherich; anchoring of the organization Escherich in Carinthia, Tyrol, and Styria with connection to Hungary; proposal for listening posts in Munich to monitor these efforts;10. Report, [without author], [1920]: Influence of Police President Pöhner and Peasant Leader Heim on Kahr; Cooperation of Pöhner with Escherich and Ludendorff Group; Anti-Semitic agitation and riots of the NSDAP presumably under Aegide Pöhner;11. Report Prussian Legation in Munich, 01. November 1920: Statement on the record [Naumann] of "Bavarian personalities", including Kahr, Escherich, Pöhner, Heim, Faulhaber, member of the royal family, recommendations for the defence against French and separatist efforts by setting up envoys of the Reich government with South German governments; 12th report Künzelmann, correspondence C. Bosch, Reich Foreign Ministry, 25-27 October 1920: The French envoy in Bavaria is misled by Wittelsbach agents; the former royal family's hopes for restoration and acquisition of Tyrol and Salzburg with France's help; the French attitude towards Bavaria is changed; the House of Habsburg is supported by France;13. Mitteilungen aus München, [ohne Verfasser], Korrespondenz Stresemann, Simons, 27. October-09 November 1920: Wishes of the Bayerische Volkspartei (BVP) concerning the form of government, the establishment of envoys and the annexation of Austria; Kahr's accession to the BVP; particularist tendencies; aims and equipment of the local defence forces; warning of the dissolution of the EWW and a left-wing Reich government; statement by Simon; 14th Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 10th issue of the German Allgemeine Zeitung. November 1920: Transmission of a report by the Württemberg central organ "Deutsches Volksblatt" on the decision of the Entente to carry out the occupation of the Ruhr in the event of further non-delivery of military weapons and maintenance of the local defence forces in Bavaria;15th Bavarian Minister President Kahr to Simons, 22 November 1920: Preparation of Kahr's trip to Berlin to discuss questions from the local defence forces (with note from the Foreign Office);16th Confidential Correspondence Stockhammern, Simons, 07. and December 15, 1920: Discussion of Nuntius Pacelli, Italian Ambassador de Martino and Stockhammer in Munich on Bavaria's separatist efforts; wishes of the Italian government to maintain German unity; Nuntius's evasive statement on Martino's questions regarding the curia's attitude to separatism; 17th submission of Nuremberg City Council to Reich President, Correspondence Office of the Reich President, Board of Nuremberg City Council, December 30, 1920-07. January 1921: Appeal against the new order of the State Commissioners concerning the obligation to approve assemblies and against the continued existence of the 1919 Ordinance on the Restriction of Freedom of Assembly; recognition of the unconstitutionality of the Ordinance by the President of the Reich;18. Rechberg an Stresemann [excerpt], [28. December 1920]: Urgent warning against French proposals to maintain the Resident's Defences after Bavarian annexation of France; determination of Bavaria to take an uncompromising stance on questions of the Resident's Defences and disappointment at insufficient support by the Reich government;19. December 1921 on the establishment of this legation;21. report representative of the Reich government in Munich, letter Zech to the Foreign Office, 30 January-31 March 1922: statement on reports on relations between Bavaria and Austrian Alpine countries; no promise Kahr regarding the deployment of auxiliary troops to Salzburg; local support in political unrest in the border region; reference to statements of the BVP organ "Regensburger Anzeiger" on Mauracher;22. report by Zech to the Foreign Office, 30 January-31 March 1922: statement on relations between Bavaria and Austrian Alpine countries; no promise Kahr regarding the deployment of auxiliary troops to Salzburg; reference to statements of the BVP organ "Regensburger Anzeiger" on Mauracher;23. Comment [Minister Zech] to report to the Passport Office Salzburg an Auswärtiges Amt, [1922]: Practices, reasons and aims of Bavarian particularism; hope for the annexation especially of Tyrol and Salzburg; acute danger of separatism only in case of possible revolution in Berlin, occupation of the Ruhr and the like; financing of the separatists presumably by France; distrust of the legal circles against "Bund Oberland" because of its loyalty to the Reich;23. Note Auswärtiges Amt on WTB report no. 1402 of 20 July 1922: Attitude of the Reich representative in Munich in high treason matter Count Leoprechting; vote of no confidence and Bavarian desire for recall Zech;24th report German Embassy Paris, 02 August 1922: Statement [Peretti] on the German declaration concerning exclusion of the public in the high treason trial Leoprechting in Munich and witness statements on support for Leoprechting by French envoy Dard;25th secret report German Embassy Paris, 10th report August 1922: Rumours concerning Paris negotiations with Crown Prince Rupprecht about restoration of the Wittelsbach dynasty, separation of Bavaria from the Reich and merger with Austrian disclosure of information through correspondence in the Chicago Daily News about France's presumed interest in Rupprecht's proposals;26. Note from the Federal Foreign Office, [without date]: Programme speech by the Bavarian Prime Minister Knilling on 9 November 1922 (Frankfurter Zeitung No. 805 of 10 November 1922);27. Confidential notes [Rosenberg], ]9 January 1923]: Statements by the Austrian envoy on Bavarian loyalty to the Reich from "Kahr to Knilling"; danger to the unity of the Reich in the event of possible weakness against French influences;28. Reports Reichsvertreter in Munich, [16.]-17. January 1923: Concern of Bavarian party circles about a possible NSDAP coup on the occasion of the consecration of the flag on 20 January; Kahr's belief in Hitler's rejection of such actions; statement by the Bavarian envoy Preger and his intention to warn Kahr of the consequences of a Nazi coup;29. Report German Embassy London, January 18, 1923: Berlin warning to secretary of the Anglo-Jewish Association against a planned pogrom in Bavaria, taking advantage of the excitement about the occupation of the Ruhr; support of the movement with French money; request for energetic intervention by the Reich government and warnings from the German press for prudence;30. Records and telegram from the Federal Foreign Office, Reichsvertreter reports in Munich, 21 January 1923: Bavarian envoy Preger reports on steps taken by the Reich government to recall the French envoy in Munich and on the trip of the Bavarian Minister of the Interior to Berlin; no mobilization of the press against envoy Dard; Kahr doubts NS program plans in Munich;31. Rundtelegramm Auswärtiges Amt an diplomatische Vertreter, 21. January 1923: Protests against the Ruhr occupation in Munich; mass meetings of the SPD; resolution of the Reich government to maintain German unity; press reports on dwindling influence of Hitler because of disapproval of his overthrow propaganda;32. WTB-Meldung Nr. 194 vom 24. January 1923: Protection of the French envoy in Munich by the Bavarian government while refusing responsibility for his security; Renewed demand for Dard's dismissal;33. Reports by the German Embassy in Paris and Reichsvertreter in Munich, Telegramm Auswärtiges Amt, 26 January-03 February 1923: International law concerns of Ambassador Hoesch against the conduct of the Bavarian government and France's action in the case of Ambassador Dard; note by the Reich government regarding the renewed demand for Dard's recall and possible threat of delivery of the passports to Dard; statement by France and protest against the boycott of the French embassy personnel in Munich;34. Report by representatives of the Reich government in Munich, January 27, 1923: Concern Kahr about the mass march of the legal associations and presumed counter-demonstrations; ban on assembly and proclamation of the state of emergency; threats by Hitler; uncertainty about the conduct of the Reich Armed Forces; confession of Reich unity by Münchner Neuester Nachrichten and "Münchner-Augsburger Abendzeitung"; 35th note by the Foreign Office concerning the telegram [Haniel], January 05, 1923. February 1923: Rumors in Munich about alleged agreements between Bavaria and East Prussia against simultaneous defeat under Bavarian leadership; warning against "warlike tones" in planned Reich Chancellor speech;26th Report German Embassy Washington, 20. February 1923: Introduction of Count Lerchenfeld by President Harding; disapproval of the French occupation of the Ruhr by the US government; disappointment in the State Department at the low echo of the Hitler movement because of the possible development of Hitler into a "kind of Mussolini" and the elimination of socialism in Germany;37. Report by representatives of the Reich government in Munich, 13 April 1923: No confirmation of the rumours of an imminent coup by the national associations; slight danger due to disagreement between the associations and general mood; possible change of direction in the event of a left-wing Reich government or concessions in the Ruhr question;38. Haniel an Rosenberg, May 7, 1923: Statement of the Bavarian Prime Minister von Knilling on the possible entry of the Social Democrats into the Reich government; impossibility of the two-front struggle against Hitler and the Socialist government; dismissal of the Bavarian envoy in Berlin if Breitscheid is appointed Reich Foreign Minister;39. Note from the Federal Foreign Office, [06] June 1923: Mitteilungen [Iversen] aus Füssen concerning the occupation of the Ruhr, use of the Ruhr donation, forthcoming appointment of Kahr as president of Bavaria and Kahr's advance against the state court; 40th report from the German Embassy in Paris, 13 July 1923: passing on a Havas report on the high treason trial against Fuchs and Others, and the role of the French commander Richler; 41st report from the German Embassy in Paris, [06] June 1923: Iversen, [06] June 1923: Mitteilungen [06] June 1923: [06] June 1923: Iversen, [06] June 1923: Report from the German Embassy in Paris, [06] July 1923: Iversen, [06] June 1923: Iversen, [06] June 1923: Iversen, [06] June 1923: Iversen, [06] June 1923: Iversen, [06]. Report Representative of the Reich Government in Munich, July 16, 1923: Demarche of the French businessman Pozzi because of inscriptions on pubs concerning prohibition of access for French and Belgians; no legal means for the government to intervene; threats Pozzi with reprisals and other French complaints;42. Report by the German Embassy in Bern, 31 July 1923: Belgian royal couple approves the latest plan for the restoration of the Wittelsbach family; Brüske rejection by Poincaré; French-Belgian differences on the question of reparations;43. Exchange of Notes Bayerischer Gesandter Berlin, Reichskanzlei, 14-19 September 1923: Statement by Bavaria on Statements by the Reich Chancellor in the Foreign Affairs Committee; Warning of Negotiations on the Rhineland and Ruhr because of French Intentions; No Surrender of German Territories by the Reich Government; Proposals to France, England and Others concerning the Solution of the Ruhr Question; Determination of the Reich Government to Proceed Against Unconstitutional Currents;44. von Schubert to former Reichsminister Schiffe, 22 September 1923: Letter Vietinghoff of 12 September 1923 on German success in The Hague concerning the Polish colonist question and Bavaria's attitude in the event of the Reich's government yielding to the Allies;45. Records [Reich Foreign Ministry] of a meeting with French embassy on 27 September 1923 September 1923: The Reich government abandons passive resistance; no authorization from the Margerie to make statements about French compensations; demonstrations in Bavaria because of German "capitulation"; nationalist tendencies of the communists; intransigence of the French press;46. Report German Embassy Washington, September 29, 1923: "Washington Post" on the advantages of a Bavarian monarchy and the smashing of Germany (quotation, English);47th note from the Foreign Office on the intercession of Haniel from Munich on September 29, 1923: Instruction Kahr to public prosecutors and police to suspend the enforcement of the Republic Protection Act; consequences of the high treason proceedings against the executive committee of the Bavarian Federation of Transport Officials and prohibition of the "Ethnic Observer"; warning Haniel against a test of strength with Bavaria;48. Motion by Koenen and his comrades in the Reichstag, 02 October 1923: Immediate repeal of the so-called strike regulation in Bavaria because it favored a monarchist overthrow and Bavaria's separation from the Reich;49th report by the German Embassy in Rome, 04 October 1923: Tendentious reports by the Italian press and the Havas agency on the powerlessness of the Reich government against Bavaria; disloyalty to Kahr, proposals for better information from abroad;50th report by the German Embassy in Rome, 04 October 1923: Tendentious reports by the Italian press and the Havas agency on the powerlessness of the Reich government against Bavaria; disloyalty to Kahr, proposals for better information from abroad. Report German Embassy Paris, October 4, 1923: Meeting with French politician Rey; France's thoughts on the creation of an independent Rhine republic promoted by the strengthening of the separatist movement; Poincaré's presumed intention to delay the reparations problem until after the French elections; recognition of the British demands by France; including:Supplementary information on the site of the find:Albert (see above structure: III.3, 6649-6652), (III.42, 6793); Allizé (III.11, 6675-6688; 6693-6697); Aloisi (I.5), (I.17, 6169-6172); (II.1, 6267, (II.8, 6350-6379), (II.7), (II.20)Bensch (II.2); Blomberg (II.6, 6340-6342), (II.12); Borah (I.4, 6019-6020); Bothmer (III.3, 6649-6652); Bülow (I.17, 6169-6172), (II.8, 6350-6379), (II.14, 6446-6447)Cerruti (I.8, (6075-6082), (II.5, 6329-6339), (II.8, 6350-6379), (II.10, 6390, 6401-6402), (II.20), (II.22, 6611), (II.25, 6628-6632, 6644); Cuno (III.37, 6784-6785)Daladier (II.2), (II.24, 6623-6627); Dard (III.12, 6689-6692), (III.11, 6675-688, 6693-6697), (III.18, 6729-6730); Davis (I.3, 6017), (I.8, 60075-6082), (II.3, 6311-6313); Dollfuss (II.12)Ebert (III.17, 6725-6728); Escherich (III.3, 6649-6652), (III.13, 6701-6708), (III.11, 6675-6688, 6693-6697)Other provenances:National Archives Washington DC, Guide 0, S.26, T 120, roll 1605.

Kapp, Wolfgang (existing)
Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, VI. HA, Nl Kapp, W. · Fonds
Fait partie de Secret State Archive of Prussian Cultural Heritage (Archivtektonik)

1st Biographical Information on Wolfgang Kapp Wolfgang Kapp was born in New York on July 24, 1858, the son of the lawyer Friedrich Kapp, who had played an important role in the bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1848 and had to emigrate to the United States because of his participation in the Baden uprising. Wolfgang Kapp's mother was Louise Engels and was the daughter of the Major General and Commander of Cologne Engels. The family was originally called d'Ange and immigrated from France to Germany in 1687 after the Edict of Nantes. In 1870 Friedrich Kapp returned to Germany with his family; he lived in Berlin and was a national liberal, later a liberal member of the Reichstag from 1872-1877 and 1881-1884; he also worked as a renowned historian. Friedrich Kapp died in 1884, his son Wolfgang studied in Tübingen and Göttingen. He completed his studies in 1880 with a doctorate. Probably in 1881 Wolfgang Kapp married Margarete Rosenow, the daughter of a landowner in Dülzen (district Preußisch Eylau). After his marriage Kapp seems to have familiarized himself with the administration of a large agricultural business on his father-in-law's estate, because it was not until 1885 that he began his actual professional career as a trainee with the government in Minden. In 1886 he joined the Ministry of Finance, Department II, Administration of Direct Taxes, as a government assistant. From 1890 to 1899 he was district administrator in Guben. In 1890, at the beginning of his time as district administrator, Kapp bought the Rittergut Pilzen estate near the Rosenov estate and thus entered the circle of the East Prussian Great Agrarians. Out of his interest for the interests of agriculture a work of agricultural policy content arose in Guben, which attracted a great deal of attention in the Ministry of Agriculture, so that an appointment as a government council followed in 1900. Kapp was appointed to the I. Dept. Administration of Agricultural and Stud Affairs, Department of Agricultural Workers' Affairs, but during the era of Reich Chancellor von Bülow as Commissioner of the Prussian Ministry of Agriculture he was primarily active in the preparation of the customs tariff of 1902 and in the initiation of the new trade agreements of 1904-1906. Kapp gained his first foreign policy experience in negotiations with representatives of foreign countries. Kapp soon gained a closer relationship with the then Reich Chancellor von Bülow, with whom he shared similar political views. During his time at the Ministry of Agriculture, Kapp seems to have had ambitious plans for his future professional and political career and at least aspired to the position of district president. That his plans went even further can be seen from the recording of a conversation between Kaiser Wilhelm II and the General Field Marshal von der Goltz, in which the possibility of Kapp's successor in the Reich Chancellery was considered. However, this conversation, whose date lies between 1909 and 1911, took place at a time when Kapp had already left the Prussian civil service. The reason for his resignation from the Ministry of Agriculture seems to have been his annoyance at not taking his person into account when appointing district presidents. On 5 April 1906, the East Prussian countryside elected the owner of the Pilzen manor as general landscape director. It is very characteristic of Kapp's personality under what circumstances he became known in East Prussia through a trial he conducted against the landscape. The landscapes of the Prussian provinces were self-governing bodies and as such primarily representations of landowners. But the landscape also served as a representative body for state fiscal policy. Its real task, of course, lay outside the political sphere in granting credit to cooperatives. However, the credit policy has had a decisive influence on the distribution of property and the social structure of the provinces and has thus had political repercussions. Through the incorporation of agricultural banks and fire societies in the 19th century, the landscapes had become efficient organisations at provincial level. Kapp took on the new tasks with his own vehemence. He continued the landscape in the specified direction, primarily by developing the branch network of the Landschaftsbank, by merging the landscape with the East Prussian Feuersozietät, by granting more loans, particularly for small property, and by increasing the landscape funds. His policy was aimed at freeing agriculture, which was in a serious crisis at the beginning of the 20th century, from its dependence on state aid and enabling it to help itself by means of credit policy measures. In the course of these efforts, Kapp tackled three major tasks. First and foremost the question of agricultural debt relief, which the Prussian state initiated in 1906 with the law on the debt limit. Kapp was the first to try to make this framework law effective from the initiative of the parties themselves without further state aid by showing different ways of debt relief. The inclusion of life insurance as a means of reducing debt proved particularly effective. Instead of debt repayment, the premium payment was made to an agricultural life insurance company. This ensured that a certain amount of capital was available for debt reduction in the event of death. The second task resulted from the former. The desire to combine public-law life insurance with debt relief necessitated the creation of a number of public-law life insurance institutions, which were merged into an association chaired by Kapp. These facilities were especially designed to prevent the outflow of premium money from the countryside to the large cities, where it had been used especially for the construction of tenements. However, the outflow of capital was only one danger, the other was the rural exodus that began in the 19th century. He tried to strengthen small agricultural holdings with a colonization and agricultural workers' bill, which was accepted by the General Landtag in 1908. This measure was based on the recognition of the untenability of the institution of instants and deputants, who were in the closest dependence on the lord of the manor and who emigrated from this situation in masses to the large cities, where they strengthened the ranks of the industrial proletariat. The organ for settlement policy should be a landscaped settlement bank. The third task that Kapp set himself was the creation of a public-law national insurance scheme following the public-law life insurance scheme. This measure was primarily directed against the Volksversicherungsanstalt "Volksfürsorge", created by the Social Democrats, and was intended to secure capital for agricultural workers to buy their own farms by means of abbreviated insurance. These plans did not lead to the hoped-for success, but ended in a bitter feud with the private insurance companies, especially the Deutsche Volksversicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft. In addition to his functions within the East Prussian landscape, Kapp was also active in various other bodies. In December 1906 he was appointed to the Stock Exchange Committee of the Reichsamt des Innern and in 1912 to the Supervisory Board of Deutsche Bank. The First World War gave Kapp's life and work a whole new direction. Kapp's biography is too little researched to judge how far he had buried his ambitious plans, which apparently pushed him to the top of the Reich government, or postponed them only for a better opportunity. Although Kapp had been a member of the German Conservative Party since at least 1906, he did not take the path of an existing party to make a political career. This path probably did not correspond to his personality, described as authoritarian, ambitious and independent. He made the great leap into high politics through his sensational conflict with Reich Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg. In his memo of 26 May 1916 "Die nationalen Kreise und der Reichs-Kanzler", which he sent to 300 public figures, including Bethmann Hollweg himself, he sharply criticised what he considered to be the weak policy of the Reich Chancellor, to whom he v. a. accused him of his alleged pacting with social democracy, his reluctance to America and his rejection of the unrestricted submarine war demanded by extremely militaristic circles, but also of a false war economic policy. The sharp reaction of Bethmann Hollweg, who spoke in a Reichstag session of "pirates of public opinion", among others, who abused "with the flag of the national parties", Kapp perceived as a personal affront to which he reacted with a demand for a duel. On the contrary, Kapp had to take an official reprimand and his re-election as General Landscape Director, which had taken place in March 1916 on a rotational basis, was refused confirmation by the Prussian State Ministry. Since his friends held on to Kapp in the East Prussian landscape, he was re-elected in 1917. This time - since Bethmann Hollweg had been overthrown in the meantime - he was able to take up his post as general landscape director again. At first, the events of 1916 led him even more into politics. Here he expressed solidarity with a circle of extremely reactionary and aggressive military forces around General Ludendorff and Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, who pursued a ruthless internal perseverance policy that tightened up all the forces of the people and a policy of unrestrained annexation and total warfare towards the outside world. Emperor Wilhelm II, who in principle sympathized with this extreme direction, had to refrain from supporting this group out of various considerations of public opinion and the negative attitude of the party majorities in the Reichstag. Kapp and his comrades-in-arms assumed in their political ambitions the complete certainty of the German final victory. They closed their eyes to the already looming possibility of defeat for Germany, especially after America entered the war. The war and peace goals they represented, especially the annexation plans at the expense of Russia and Poland, which were later only surpassed by Hitler, were marked by uncontrolled wishful thinking that in no way corresponded to objective reality. His extreme attitude drove Kapp into a blind hatred against any social and democratic movement; his fierce opposition against social democracy was mainly based on the legend of the dagger thrust against the imperialist Germany struggling to win. This military and National Socialist sharpening, for which Kapp found moral and financial support in certain circles of military leadership, but also among a number of university professors, writers, local politicians, agriculturalists, industrialists and bankers, culminated in the founding of the German National Party, which took place on 2 September 1917 (the "Sedan Day") in the Yorksaal of the East Prussian landscape. Although Kapp was clearly the spiritus rector of this "collection party", two other persons were pushed into the foreground, intended for the eyes of the public: These were the Grand Admiral von Tirpitz as 1st chairman and Duke Johann Albrecht von Mecklenburg as honorary chairman of this party. The German Fatherland Party did not seek seats in the Reichstag, but saw itself as a pool of national forces to bring about Germany's final victory. The statute provided for the immediate dissolution of the party once its purpose had been achieved. In addition to mobilising all forces to achieve military victory, Kapp's founding of the party also had another purpose that was not made so public. Tirpitz, then 68 years old, was to be launched as a "strong man" to replace the "weak" chancellors Bethmann Hollweg and Michaelis. It was obvious that in this case Kapp would join the leadership of the imperial government as advisor to the politically ultimately inexperienced Grand Admiral. The November Revolution of 1918 and the immediate surrender of Germany put an abrupt end to these lofty plans. But Kapp and his friends did not admit defeat. Although the German Fatherland Party was dissolved in December 1918, it was immediately replaced by a new party, the German National People's Party, which developed into a bourgeois mass party during the Weimar Republic, but no longer under Kapp's leadership. After the fall of the Hohenzollern monarchy, Kapp immediately opposed the revolution and the Weimar Republic. He could not or did not want to accept the social and political conditions that had arisen in the meantime; his goal was clearly the restoration of pre-war conditions. The sources, which were only incomplete at that time, do not show when the idea of a coup d'état was born and how the conspiracy developed in all its branches. A close associate of Kapp's, Reichswehrhauptmann Pabst, had already attempted a failed coup in July 1919. Together with Kapp, Pabst created the "National Unification" as a pool of all counter-revolutionary forces and associations. This Reich organisation was to coordinate the preparations for the coup in Prussia and Bavaria, while Kapp was to develop East Prussia into the decisive base of counterrevolution. From here, with the help of the Freikorps operating in the Baltic States, the Reichswehr and the East Prussian Heimatbund, whose chairman was Kapp, the survey was to be carried to Berlin with the immediate aim of preventing the signing of the Versailles Treaty. The approval of the Versailles Treaty by the parliamentary majority has created a new situation. Now Ludendorff, one of the co-conspirators, proposed to carry out the coup directly in Berlin, whereby the Baltic people, who were disguised as work detachments on the large Eastern Elbe goods, were to take over the military support. Meanwhile, the conspirators, headed by Kapp and Reichswehr General Lüttwitz, tried to gain the mass base absolutely necessary for the execution of the coup d'état through a broad-based nationalist smear campaign. The company was already at risk before it could even begin. Kapp had demanded that his military allies inform him at least 14 days before the strike so that he could make the necessary political preparations. That the coup d'état had just begun on 13 March 1920 depended not so much on carefully considered planning, but on coincidences that were not predictable. One of the reasons for the premature strike was the dissolution of the Freikorps, especially the Ehrhardt Brigade, decided by the Reich government. This revealed the fact that, in the absence of a party of their own, the conspirators were unable to avoid relying on the loose organization of the resident defence forces, which to a certain extent were also influenced by social democracy. The whole weakness of the company was evident in the question on which forces the new government should actually be based. While the military saw an arrangement with the strongest party, social democracy, as unavoidable, Kapp categorically rejected pacting with social democracy. He wanted to put the Social Democrat-led government as a whole into protective custody. But now the government was warned; for its part, it issued protective arrest warrants against the heads of the conspirators and left Berlin on March 12. In the early morning of March 13, the Navy Brigade Ehrhardt marched into Berlin without encountering armed resistance, as would have been the duty of the Reichswehr. Kapp proclaimed himself Chancellor of the Reich and began with the reorganisation of the government. The order of the new rulers to arrest the escaped imperial government and to remove the state government if they did not stand on the side of the putschists was only partially executed by the local commanders. The proclamation of the general strike on 13 March and the reports arriving from the most important cities and industrial centres about joint actions of the working class prompted the indirect supporters of Kapp, the large industrialists and the Reichswehr generals, to adopt a wait-and-see attitude. Kapp had to see the hopelessness of his company. Eyewitnesses reported that Kapp had spent almost 3 days of his time as Chancellor of the Reich "with gossip". On March 15, the "adventure" was over. Kapp apparently stayed hidden with friends near Berlin for some time after the failed coup and then flew to Sweden in a provided plane. Here he initially lived under different false names in different places, at last in a pension in Robäck, but was soon recognized and temporarily taken into custody. The Swedish government granted asylum to the refugee, but he had to commit himself to refrain from all political activities. When the high treason trial against the heads of the March company in Leipzig began, Kapp was moved by the question of his position in court. At first, he justified his non-appearance with the incompetence of the Ebert government and with the constitution, which in his opinion did not exist. Kapp said that there was no high treason in the legal sense against the "high treason" of social democracy. When in December 1921 one of the co-conspirators, the former district president of Jagow, was sentenced to a fortress sentence by the Imperial Court, Kapp changed his mind. Still in Sweden he worked out a justification for the process ahead of him, in which he denied any guilt in both an objective and a subjective sense. On the contrary, he intended to appear before the court with a charge against the then government. It didn't come to that anymore. Kapp had already fallen ill in Sweden. At the beginning of 1922 he returned to Germany and was remanded in custody. On 24 April 1922, he underwent surgery in Leipzig to remove a malignant tumour from the left eye. Kapp died on 12 June 1922; he was buried on 22 June at the village churchyard in Klein Dexen near his estate Pilzen. 2. inventory history The inventory, which had been formed in its essential parts by Kapp himself, was transferred by the family to the Prussian Secret State Archives as a deposit in 1935. Here the archivist Dr. Weise started already in the year of submission with the archival processing, which could not be completed, however. In the course of the repatriation of the holdings of the Secret State Archives, which had been removed during the Second World War, the Kapp estate was transferred to the Central State Archives, Merseburg Office. In 1951, Irmela Weiland, a trainee, classified and listed the stock here. As a result of the processing a find-book was created, which was until the new processing in the year 1984 the kurrente find-auxiliary. 1984 the stock was to be prepared for the backup filming. It turned out that the processing carried out in 1951 did not meet today's archival requirements, so that a general revision was considered necessary. The graduate archivists Renate Endler and Dr. Elisabeth Schwarze rearranged and simply listed the holdings according to the principles of order and indexing for the state archives of the German Democratic Republic, Potsdam 1964. The found file units were essentially retained, in individual cases they were dissolved and new indexing units were formed. In addition, 0.50 m of unprocessed documents were incorporated into the estate. The old regulatory scheme, which was essentially broken down chronologically, was replaced by a new regulatory scheme based on Kapp's areas of activity. In the course of the revision, the portfolio was re-signed. The relationship between the old and the new signatures was established through a concordance. The new find book replaces the previously valid find book from 1951. The stock is to be quoted: GStA PK, VI. HA Family Archives and Bequests, Nl Wolfgang Kapp, No... 3) Some remarks on the content of the holdings The Kapp estate contains 7.50 running metres of archival material from the period from 1885 to 1922, including some earlier and later individual pieces. The holdings mainly contain documents from Kapp's official and political activities, to a lesser extent also correspondence within the family and documents from the administration of the Knights' Manor Pilzen. The density of transmission to the individual sections of Kapp's professional and political development is quite different. While his activities with the Minden government, in the Prussian Ministry of Finance and as district administrator in Guben are relatively poorly documented, there is a rather dense tradition about his activities as director of the general landscape and as chairman of the German Fatherland Party. The documentation on the preparation and implementation of the coup shows gaps which can be explained, among other things, by the fact that important agreements were only reached orally at the stage of preparing the coup. Moreover, Kapp, who had to flee hastily to Sweden after the coup d'état failed, was no longer able to give this part of his estate the same care as the former one. Overall, however, it is a legacy of great political importance and significance. Merseburg, 2. 10.1984 signed Dr. Elisabeth Schwarze Diplomarchivar Compiled and slightly shortened: Berlin, April 1997 (Ute Dietsch) The clean copy of the find book was made by Britta Baumgarten. Note After the reunification of the two German states, the Merseburg office was closed, the archival records and thus also the Kapp estate were returned to the Secret State Archives in Berlin (1993). From the inventory maps, this reference book was created after maps that no longer existed were replaced (post-distortion of files). XIII Bibliography (selection) Bauer, Max : March 13, 1920 Berlin 1920 Bernstein, Richard : Der Kapp-Putsch und seine Lehren. Berlin 1920 Brammer, Karl : Five days of military dictatorship. Berlin 1920 Documents on the Counterrevolution using official material: The same: Constitutional Foundations and High Treason. According to stenographic reports and official documents of the Jagow trial. Berlin 1922 Erger, Johannes : The Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch. Düsseldorf 1967 Falkenhausen, Fri. from : Wolfgang Kapp. In: Conservative Monthly July/August 1922 Kern, Fritz : Das Kappsche Abenteuer. Impressions and findings. Leipzig/Berlin 1920 Könnemann, Erwin : Residents' Weirs and Time Volunteer Associations. Berlin 1971 Noske, Gustav : From Kiel to Kapp. Berlin 1920 Rothfels, Hans : Article "Wolfgang Kapp" in: Deutsches biogra- phisches Jahrbuch Bd 4 (1922) Berlin/Leipzig 1929, correspondence. 132-143 (Here also a drawing of the works Kapps) Schemann, Ludwig : Wolfgang Kapp and the March company. A word of atonement. Munich/Berlin 1937 Taube, Max : Causes and course of the coup of 13 March 1920 and his teachings for the working class and the middle classes. Munich 1920 Wauer, W. : Behind the scenes of the Kapp government. Berlin 1920 Wortmann, K. Geschichte der Deutschen Vaterlandspartei In: Hallische Forschungen zur neueren Geschichte. Volume 3, Hall 1926 Contents I. Introduction Page II 1 Biographical Information on Wolfgang Kapp Page II 2 History of the Collection Page X 3 Some Remarks on the Content of the Collection Page XI 4 Literature in Selection Page XIII II Structure of the Collection Page XIV III Collection Page XVII (Order Numbers, Title, Duration Page 1-106)) XVII III. holdings (order numbers, file title, duration) Description of holdings: Lebenssdaten: 1858 - 1921 Finds: database; find book, 1 vol.

Kriegsmarinedienststellen (inventory)
BArch, RM 108 · Fonds · 1939-1945
Fait partie de Federal Archives (Archivtektonik)

History of the Inventory Designer: Before the Second World War, four Kriegsmarinedienststellen (KMD) with headquarters in Hamburg, Bremen, Stettin and Königsberg were responsible for the provision of relief ships and personnel and the execution of troop and supply transports. During the war they were assigned branches on the German coast and in occupied foreign countries. In addition, special maritime transport services have been set up, each with its own head of maritime transport for the Aegean Sea, Norway, Italy and the Black Sea. These maritime transport services were each assigned a number of subordinate maritime transport points. There were other sea transport points in Finland, France and on the eastern Baltic Sea. Inventory description: In 1920, so-called offices of the navy management were formed in Königsberg, Stettin, Lübeck, Hamburg and Bremen, which were directly subordinated to the head of the sea transport department in the navy management. Tasks were the supervision of the coastal intelligence in cooperation with the command offices, as well as connection and switching to local places of the merchant shipping and organizations of the merchant navy. Through these services, the naval leadership was able to make camouflaged preparations for mobilization and influence all nautical issues concerning naval warfare and coastal defense. The tasks of the Lübeck office were taken over by the Hamburg office in 1928. In 1931 the offices were renamed Reichswehrdienststelle Hamburg (subordinated to Wehrkreis II) and Reichsmarinedienststellen Königsberg, Stettin and Bremen. On 4 July 1935 the Reichswehrdienststelle Hamburg and Reichsmarinedienststellen in Königsberg, Stettin and Bremen were renamed Kriegsmarinedienststellen (KMD). At the top of every KMD was a sea officer, in Hamburg in the rank of an admiral, in Bremen, Stettin and Königsberg in the rank of a captain at sea. The Kriegsmarinedienststellen were directly responsible to the Ob.d.M. for all technical and special tasks and in the personal affairs of the officials belonging to their area of command. In the other questions they were subordinated to the station commands of the North Sea (Hamburg and Bremen) and the Baltic Sea (Stettin and Königsberg). The second admirals could give instructions to the KMD for mob work. When the war began in September/October 1939, numerous branch offices were set up at the existing KMD, but they were all closed again by mid-1943. In March 1940 a new KMD was set up in Gdansk and the Navy Plenipotentiary in Gdansk was appointed Admiral of the KMD Gdansk. At the same time, KMD Königsberg was dissolved and converted into a branch of KMD Gdansk. The importance of the KMD Gdansk continued to decline from mid-1944, and from July 1944 the office was no longer headed by a flag officer. Gdansk was taken by the Soviet army on 30.3.1945. The outpost boat group under Oberlt. zur See Thorn controlled the lagoon transports calling at Schwarzort and also carried out the loading and unloading. After the surrender, the KMD Hamburg was renamed "Marinedienstgruppe Hamburg" in 1945. Characterisation of the contents: War diaries and files of larger volumes have survived from the war naval stations in Hamburg, Bremen and Stettin as well as the branches in Ostend and Rotterdam. The documents of the Kriegsmarinedienststellen in the occupied territories are in stock RM 45 Dienst- und Kommandostellen der Kriegsmarine with regional and local competence. State of preservation: Archivalienverzeichnis Scope, Explanation: Stock without increment 2.9 lfm 146 AE Citation method: BArch, RM 108/...

OKH / General Staff of the Army (stock)
BArch, RH 2 · Fonds · 1919-1945
Fait partie de Federal Archives (Archivtektonik)

Geschichte des Bestandsbildners: Das Allgemeine Truppenamt (TA) wurde 1919 errichtet. Aus ihm ging 1935 der Generalstab des Heeres (GenStdH) hervor. Dieser gliederte sich wie folgt: Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres (ChefdGenStdH), zuvor Chef des Truppen amtes (ChefTA); Zentralabteilung des Generalstabes des Heeres (GZ), zuvor Zentralgruppe (TZ); Operationsabteilung (1. Abt.GenStdH), zuvor Heeres abteilung (T 1); Organisationsabteilung (2. Abt.GenStdH), zuvor Heeres organisationsabteilung (T 2); Abteilung Fremde Heere (3. Abt.GenStdH), zuvor Abteilung Fremde Heere (T 3); Heeresausbildungsabteilung (4. Abt GenStdH), zuvor Heeresausbildungsabteilung (T 4); Transportabteilung (5. Abt.GenStdH), zuvor Transportabteilung (T 5). Verselbständigte sich zu Beginn des Zweiten Weltkrieges als "Chef des Transportwesens"; Quartiermeisterabteilung (6. Abt.GenStdH), zuvor Gruppe V der Heeres abteilung (T 1 V). Zu Kriegsbeginn verselbständigt als "Generalquartier meister"; Kriegswissenschaftliche Abteilung (7. Abt.GenStdH), zuvor Kriegswissenschaftliche Abteilung (TK), 1942 verselbständigt; Attach bteilung, entstanden 1940 durch Erweiterung der 1934 eingerichteten Attach-Gruppe. Dem Truppenamt angegliedert war die Heeresfriedenskommission, die bis 1927 bestand. Ab 1935 wurden zur Entlastung des Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres sukzessive die Oberquartiermeister I bis V eingerichtet und unter ihrer Führung einzelne Abteilungen des Generalstabes zusammengefaßt, bis 1942 dann aber wieder aufgelöst. Ebenso wurden die 8. Abt. GenStdH (Technische Abt.), die 9. Abt. GenStdH (Heeresvermessungswesen und Militärgeographie), sie 10. Abt. GenStdH (Landesbefestigungsabteilung), die 11. Abt. GenStdH (Offizierausbildungsabteilung) und die 12. Abt.GenStd (Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost) neu geschaffen. Die 8., 10. und 11. Abteilung wurden zu Beginn des Krieges aufgelöst, die 9. Abteilung verselbständigte sich 1941 als Chef des Kriegskarten- und Vermessungswesens. Bestandsbeschreibung: Das Allgemeine Truppenamt wurde 1919 im Reichswehrministerium als Nachfolgeorganisation des "Großen Generalstabes" des Kaiserreiches errichtet, nachdem Deutschland durch den Versailler Vertrag ein Generalstab oder ähnliche Institutionen verboten worden war. Nach Wiedererrichtung der Wehrhoheit wurde das Allgemeine Truppenamt im Jahre 1935 in Generalstab des Heeres umbenannt. Das Truppenamt bestand zunächst aus folgenden Abteilungen: T 1 (Heeresabteilung): Innere und äußere militärische Lage, Grenzschutz, Landesbefestigung, Truppenverwendung und -gliederung, Militärtransportwesen, Militärvermessungs- und Kartenwesen. T 2 (Organisationsabteilung): Allgemeine Heeresangelegenheiten, Organisation des Übergangs- und künftigen Heeres. T 3 (Statistische Abteilung): Sammlung und Bearbeitung von Informationsmaterialien über fremde Armeen. T 4 (Lehrabteilung): Militärische Ausbildung (auch der Offiziere), Truppenübungen, Sammlung von Erfahrungen. T 5 (Wehrabteilung): Allgemeine Angelegenheiten der Offiziere und Unteroffiziere, Vorgesetzten- und Rangverhältnisse, innerdienstliche Angelegenheiten wie Garnisons- und Wachdienst, Ehrenbezeugungen, Flaggen, Anzugsordnung und Armeemusik, Wehrgesetze nebst Ausführungsbestimmungen, Führung der Personalpapiere. T 6 (Abteilung für Erziehungs- und Bildungswesen): Allgemeine Erziehungs- und Bildungsfragen, Erziehung und Unterrichtung der Offiziersanwärter, Unteroffiziere- und Mannschaften, militärpolitische Ausbildung. T 7 (Transportabteilung): Heerestransportangelegenheiten, insb. Eisenbahntransporte und Schifffahrtsangelegenheiten. H-Friko (Heeresfriedenskommission): Dem Truppenamt angegliedert. Zuständig für die Vertretung des Reichswehrministers in allen die Heeresleitung berührenden Friedensfragen gegenüber anderen Ministerien und der Ententekommission sowie für die Mitprüfung der zur Durchführung der Friedens- und Waffenstillstandsbedingungen von den zuständigen Stellen der Heeresleitung zu treffenden Maßnahmen (1927 aufgelöst). Der zweite Entwurf der "Geschäftsverteilung des Reichswehrministeriums" vom Juni 1921 sah eine Reduzierung des Truppenamtes auf die Abteilungen T 1, T 2, T 3, T 4 und T 7 und die H-Friko vor. Im Rahmen der getarnten Aufrüstung nach 1933 wurde das Truppenamt um die Transportabteilung, die Inspektion der Festungen, die Zentralgruppe und die Kriegswissenschaftliche Abteilung erweitert. Der Generalstab des Heeres wurde durch Verfügung vom 26. Juni 1935 geschaffen. Er gliederte sich zunächst wie folgt: (siehe dazu: "Friedensgliederung des OKH mit Generalstab, 1938-1939", in: Ueberschär: Generaloberst Franz Halder, S. 104): Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres: Er stand an der Spitze des Generalstabes des Heeres, war dem Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres unterstellt und dessen erster Berater und ständiger Vertreter. Sein Arbeitsgebiet umfasste sämtliche mit der Vorbereitung und Führung eines Krieges zusammenhängenden Fragen. Zentralabteilung des Generalstabes: Die Zentralabteilung war zuständig für die Organisation der Dienststelle "Generalstab des Heeres" einschließlich der ihr nachgeordneten Behörden sowie für die Personalangelegenheiten der Generalstabsoffiziere. Dem Chef der Zentralabteilung war außerdem die Verwaltung der dem Chef des Generalstabes zur Verfügung stehenden Fonds und Stiftungen übertragen. 1. Abteilung des GenStdH - Operationsabteilung: Die Operationsabteilung hatte die Aufmarschvorbereitungen für den Kriegsfall zu bearbeiten. Daneben bereitete sie militärische Übungsreisen und operative Aufgaben zur Ausbildung der Generalstabsoffiziere vor. 2. Abteilung des GenStdH - Organisationsabteilung: Die Organisationsabteilung befasste sich mit dem Aufbau und der Gliederung des Friedens- und des Kriegsheeres; die Durchführungsanordnungen hierzu erließ das Allgemeine Heeresamt. Ferner bearbeitete sie die jährlich neu erscheinenden "Besonderen Anlagen zum Mobilmachungsplan (Heer)" und die Forderungen hinsichtlich der materiellen Rüstung (außer Munition und Betriebsstoff). 3. Abteilung des GenStdH - Abteilung Fremde Heere: Der Abteilung Fremde Heere oblag das Studium fremder Heere und militärpolitischer Probleme des Auslands durch die Auswertung der Berichte der Militärattachés und der zu ausländischen Heeren abkommandierten Offizieren. Ihr gehörte auch die Attaché-Gruppe des Generalstabes des Heeres an. 4. Abteilung des GenStdH - Heeresausbildungsabteilung: Die Heeresausbildungsabteilung erließ Verfügungen für die Truppenausbildung einschließlich der Truppenübungsplätze, für Herbst- und Sonderübungen sowie für die Ausbildung von Reserve- und Landwehrverbänden. Weiterhin hatte sie die von den Waffeninspektionen bearbeiteten Ausbildungsvorschriften vor der Ausgabe an die Truppe zu prüfen. 5. Abteilung des GenStdH - Transportabteilung: Die Transportabteilung bereitete die jährlichen Mobilmachungs- und Aufmarschtransporte vor. Im Bereich des Transportwesens war sie federführend für die ganze Wehrmacht, doch beschränkte sich ihr Arbeitsgebiet auf die Eisenbahn und auf die Binnenschifffahrt. Aus der friedensmäßigen 5. Abteilung ging zu Beginn des Zweiten Weltkrieges die OKH-Dienststelle "Chef des Transportwesens" hervor. Ihr jeweiliger Leiter war in Personalunion "Der Chef des Transportwesens der Wehrmacht" (letzterer ist ohne eigenständige Überlieferung; das Archivgut beider Dienststellen, einschließlich der Vorprovenienzen, ist im Bestand RH 4 zusammengefasst). 6. Abteilung des GenStdH - Quartiermeisterabteilung: Die Quartiermeisterabteilung hatte die Versorgung des Heeres mit allen Nachschubgütern vorzubereiten. Aus ihr entwickelte sich zu Beginn des Zweiten Weltkrieges die Dienststelle "OKH/Generalquartiermeister"(siehe Bestand RH 3). 7. Abteilung des GenStdH - Kriegswissenschaftliche Abteilung: Aufgabe der Kriegswissenschaftlichen Abteilung war die Auswertung der Kriegserfahrungen sowie die Bearbeitung, Prüfung und Herausgabe kriegswissenschaftlicher Veröffentlichungen, ferner das Studium kriegs- und heeresgeschichtlicher Probleme. Mitte 1942 wurde die 7. Abteilung geteilt in eine "Kriegswissenschaftliche Abteilung des Heeres" (siehe Bestand RH 60) und eine "Kriegswissenschaftliche Abteilung des Generalstabs des Heeres" (bereits Ende 1942 aufgelöst). Inspektion der Festungen (InFest): Der Inspekteur der Festungen hatte Vorschläge zur Ausnutzung und zum Aufbau der Landesbefestigungen zu erarbeiten. Am 24. November 1938 wurde die InFest im Rahmen der vom Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres befohlenen Organisationsänderungen der Waffeninspektionen dem Allgemeinen Heeresamt unterstellt (siehe Bestand RH 12-20). Vertragsgruppe: Sie wurde 1934 aus der Völkerbundabteilung gebildet. In der Folgezeit (ab 1935) war eine wichtige Erweiterung des Generalstabes die Bildung der Oberquartiermeister I bis V, die mehrere Abteilungen leiteten; ferner wurde die 8. (Technische Abteilung), 9. (Heeresvermessungswesen und Militärgeographie), 10. (mit zuständig für Fragen der Landesverteidigung) und 11. Abteilung (Ausbildung der Offiziere und Fortbildung der Generalstabsoffiziere) eingerichtet. Der Oberquartiermeister I war Stellvertretender Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres. Ein Teil der neu eingerichteten Abteilungen wurden nach und nach wieder aufgelöst oder ihre Aufgaben anderen Abteilungen zugeteilt (z.B. 1939 Auflösung des Oberquartiermeisters II; 1942 Auflösung des Oberquartiermeisters I und IV ¿ die Aufgaben gingen an die Operationsabteilung und Länderabteilung über; die Aufgaben der für die Generalstabsoffiziere zuständigen Personalabteilung in der Zentralabteilung wurden dem Personalamt des Heeres übertragen). Im Rahmen der Mobilmachung für den Zweiten Weltkrieg wurde der Generalstab des Heeres September 1939 in zwei Staffeln aufgegliedert: (siehe dazu: "Kriegsgliederung des OKH mit Generalstab 1939-1942", in: Ueberschär, Generaloberst Franz Halder, S. 105): Die 1. Staffel wurde als "Hauptquartier OKH" zusammengefasst. Seine Angehörigen waren dem Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres disziplinarisch unterstellt. Dieser stand an der Spitze des dem Oberbefehlshabers des Heeres zur Verfügung stehenden Führungsstabes und leitete die Operationen des Heeres in dessen Auftrag. Grundlegende Operationsbefehle wurden jedoch vom Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres unterzeichnet. Die für die Führung des Feldheeres nicht unmittelbar benötigten Teile des Generalstabes verblieben als 2. Staffel des Generalstabes des Heeres unter Führung des Oberquartiermeisters V in ihren Friedensunterkünften (Berlin), blieben dabei aber dem Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres unterstellt. Zur 2. Staffel des Generalstabes des Heeres gehörten die Zentralabteilung (GZ), die Abteilung Fremde Heeres Ost und West sowie die Ausbildungsabteilung (Ausbildungsfilmwesen), ferner die Attachéabteilung, die Kriegswissenschaftliche Abteilung und die Abteilung für Heeresvermessungswesen und Militärgeographie. Im Verlauf des Krieges veränderte sich die Organisation und Stellung des Generalstabes des Heeres. Die Führung des Polenfeldzuges lag noch in den Händen des Oberkommandos des Heeres, doch schon die Besetzung Dänemarks und Norwegens im Frühjahr 1940 (Unternehmen "Weserübung") lief unter Leitung des Chefs des Wehrmachtführungsamtes ab und wurde damit zum ersten Kriegsschauplatz des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht. Während der Westfeldzug im Mai/Juni 1940 trat die Einflussnahme Hitlers auf die Befehlsführung erstmals in den Vordergrund. Als Organ einheitlicher Befehlsgebung diente ihm das Wehrmachtführungsamt (am 8. August 1940 in "Wehrmachtführungsstab" umbenannt), das er dazu benutzte, um in die vom Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres geführten Operationen einzugreifen. Die Planung und Durchführung des Balkanfeldzuges im Frühjahr 1941 sowie die Vorarbeiten zum Krieg gegen die UdSSR lagen wiederum im wesentlichen in den Händen des Generalstabes des Heeres. Die Tätigkeit des Wehrmachtführungsstabes beschränkte sich hier auf die Bearbeitung der Weisungen Hitlers. Im Dezember 1941 wurde der Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres, Generalfeldmarschall von Brauchitsch, abgelöst, und Hitler übernahm den Oberbefehl über das Heer selbst. Bei seinen Entscheidungen über die Operationsführung des Heeres zog er immer mehr den Wehrmachführungsstab heran. In dieser Zeit begann die eigentliche Trennung nach OKH- und OKW-Kriegsschauplätzen. Während der Generalstab des Heeres die Ostfront übernahm, lag die Zuständigkeit für alle anderen Kriegsschauplätze beim Wehrmachtführungsstab. 1945 wurde der Generalstab mit dem Wehrmachtführungsstab zusammengelegt. Vorprovenienz: Großer Generalstab Erschließungszustand: Online-Findbuch Vorarchivische Ordnung: In RH 2 ist die Überlieferung aller Abteilungen des Allgemeinen Truppenamtes bzw. des Generalstabes des Heeres zusammengefasst mit Ausnahme jener Organisationseinheiten, die seit 1938 selbständig wurden (5., 6., 7. und 9. Abteilung des Generalstabes des Heeres sowie die Inspektionen der Festungen) und demzufolge im Militärarchiv eigene Bestände bilden (siehe Punkt 2.2. und 3.2). Eine Ausnahme bildet die Attachéabteilung, bei deren Zuordnung und Verbleib beim Bestand RH 2 die im Juli 1944 befohlene Unterstellung unter den Wehrmachtführungsstab/Amtsgruppe Ausland außer acht gelassen wurde. Dies konnte erfolgen, da die Überlieferung der Attachéabteilung mit den Anlagen zum Kriegstagebuch nur bis Ende Oktober 1944 reicht und dann abbricht. Insgesamt gesehen bildet der Bestand RH 2 mit seinen mehr als 3000 Nummern ein relativ abgerundetes Bild von der Tätigkeit des Allgemeinen Truppenamtes und des Generalstabes des Heeres. Das Schriftgut sowohl des Truppenamtes - hier besonders der zwanziger und dreißger - als auch des Generalstabes des Heeres wurde, sobald es nicht mehr für den laufenden Geschäftsbetrieb benötigt wurde, aus den jeweiligen Registraturen ausgesondert und an das Heeresarchiv in Potsdam bzw. an die Außenstelle des Heeresarchivs in Liegnitz abgegeben. Das Magazingebäude des Heeresarchivs Potsdam und alle in ihm lagernde Unterlagen ¿ auch die Außenstelle Liegnitz war am 7. Dezember 1944 mit allen Archivalien dorthin zurückverlegt worden - verbrannten bei dem alliierten Luftangriff am 14. April 1945. Einzelne Bestände des Heeresarchivs waren zuvor allerdings nach Bad Reichenhall ausgelagert worden. Dort jedoch wurden sie beim Näherrücken der alliierten Truppen auf Befehl von General Scherff (Beauftragter des Führers für militärische Geschichtsschreibung) teilweise verbrannt. Verhältnismäßig dicht ist die Überlieferung aus der Zeit des Zweiten Weltkrieges, doch haben viele Kriegsereignisse auch hier schmerzliche Lücken gerissen (z.B. fehlt ein Teil der Kriegstagebücher - samt Anlagen - der Operations- und Organisationsabteilung). Soweit Archivgut aber die Kriegsereignisse überdauerte und den Amerikanern in die Hände fiel, wurde es in die USA verbracht. Dies gilt auch für das seinerzeit laufende Registraturgut des Generalstabes, das nach der deutschen Kapitulation von amerikanischen Truppen in Flensburg beschlagnahmt wurde. In den 60-er Jahren erfolgte die Rückführung der Unterlagen. Eine grundlegende Überarbeitung des Bestandes erfolgte zu Beginn der 80-er Jahre, wobei die Organisation des Truppenamtes/Generalstabes als Grundlage für die Bestandsordnung diente. 3.1. Überlieferung und ggf. archivische Bewertung 3.2. Sonstige Bestände, Hinweise RH 3 OKH/Generalquartiermeister RH 4 Chef des Transportwesens RH 7 Heerespersonalamt RH 12-20 Inspektion der Festungen RH 15 Allgemeines Heeresamt RH 60 Kriegswissenschaftliche Abteilung des Heeres Kart. RH 2 (Generalstabskarten) RW 4 Wehrmachtführungsstab N 28 Beck, Ludwig (Chef GenStdH) N 63 Zeitzler, Kurt (Chef GenStdH) N 220 Halder, Franz (Chef GenStdH) N 738 Adam, Wilhelm (Chef des Truppenamtes) Umfang, Erläuterung: 3282 AE Zitierweise: BArch, RH 2/...

Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, I. HA GR, Rep. 34, Nr. 7079 · Dossier · 1763 - 1764
Fait partie de Secret State Archive of Prussian Cultural Heritage (Archivtektonik)

Contains among other things: - Settlement of bills by the envoy to Amsterdam, Philipp Anton von Erberfeld, 1764 - differences between France and Spain in colonial policy, 1764 - mass desertion from the French army, 1764 - capitulations of Swiss cantons to French troops, 1764 - death of Madame de Pompadour, 1764.

Various matters: vol. 1
BArch, R 2-ANH./49 · Dossier · (1945-) 1948-1949
Fait partie de Federal Archives (Archivtektonik)

Contains among other things: Expenditure in the field of food and grain management; establishment and tasks of the "Reichsnährstand"; enterprises involved in the Reich: Mundus GmbH and its subsidiaries, Überseeische Gesellschaft/Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft, Isteg Steel, Luxembourg, Isteg Stahl, Vienna, Nordag, Oslo, Förlagsaktiebolaget Illustra AG, Stockholm, Optische Werke, C.A. Steinheil Söhne, Munich, Societé Maritime Universelle, Paris, Slovak-Deutsche Handelskanzlei, Preßburg, Vereinigte Industrieunternehmungen AG - Viag, Berlin, Reichskreditgesellschaft, Borussia-Beteiligungs GmbH, Bank der deutschen Luftfahrt, Aero Bank, Paris; official and private war grave welfare; foreign exchange protection commands (organisation); foreign teacher (permanent positions, civil service security); German Labour Front (Financial Foundations); Deposit money at Berlin banks before surrender; Military expenditure in the accounting year 1938; The German monetary system; Reich participation in economic enterprises in Baden; Foreign workers in the German Reich 1942-1944; Tax revenues 1933-1944; Budget revenues and expenditures 1940-1944; Customs duties and excise taxes in Austria since 1945 (as of 1945): Jan. 1949); buildings for the "Führer and Reich Chancellor"; real property of the German Reich in Paris; objects of war loot of the Prince of Monaco and the Rothschild family; registration of foreign securities; principles for drawing up the Reich budget plans before and after 1933; value and specific duties